Introduction
Early conceptions of asset-based welfare reform envisaged state supported access to a raft of assets to be invested in and built up at the individual level, offsetting dependency on state benefits. In the 1990s, along with the restructuring of global capital markets around mortgage finance (cf. Aalbers, 2015) , a growing political preference manifested across societies for extending the distribution of owneroccupied assets. Home ownership thus became the focus of asset-based welfare approaches, with house price increases ostensibly representing capital augmentation for most households and a boon for many economies (Conley and Gifford, 2006; Doling and Ronald, 2010; Lowe et al., 2012; Watson, 2009) . Moreover, the ambition of asset-based welfare seemed to go beyond enhancing individual welfare autonomy to the wholesale compensation, through the promotion of home ownership, of welfare state restructuring (Malpass, 2008) . Indeed, in countries like Britain, governments increasingly appeared reliant on housing markets 'to pursue non-housing goals in regard to key areas of personal well-being such as health, education and pension provision ' (p.3) . With the subprime crash, however, followed by the Credit Crisis and subsequently the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the viability of asset-based welfare appeared in doubt. Credit dried up, housing transactions collapsed, equity evaporated and, in many contexts, owner-occupied housing sectors began to shrink. This paper addresses developments in asset-based welfare practices in context of housing market transformations in the years leading up to, and since the crisis. Our assertion is that while policy debates surrounding asset-based welfare were subdued by the GFC, the acquisition of housing has become ever more critical to household strategies for building economic capacity and welfare security in context of ostensible state austerity and diminishing expectations of pensions. Buying a home, paying off a mortgage and accumulating housing wealth has long represented a core means to offset the risk of a low-income in later life (Kemeny, 1981) . Increasingly though, along with the financialization of housing, accumulating housing property is becoming a more proactive strategy with increasing numbers procuring additional homes, often to rent (Ronald, et al, 2015) . Other approaches to housing wealth, like the equity release market, have also gained a new salience. The emerging terrain of asset-based welfare is thus, as is explored in this paper, transmogrifying.
Another mutation in asset-based welfare has been an historic intergenerational polarization. Whereas home ownership rates expanded in the late twentieth-century, since then, access has become markedly uneven. The UK is particularly illustrative of this trend with flows of young people into home ownership fading: while 60% of English 16 to 34 year olds were home owners in 1991, by 2011, the rate was just 36% (English Housing Survey, 2013) . Meanwhile, multi-property owning has proliferated with the number of private landlords increasing from about 560,000 in 1991 to 2.12 million in 2012 (ONS, 2013) . Critically, while home purchase as a basis of welfare security became economically and normatively embedded among earlier cohorts of middle-income households, this has failed to hold for younger adult generations.
Characteristic of twenty-first century housing conditions then, has been the resurgence of private renting driven by growing demand among younger adults excluded from home ownership, and the buying up of housing to let by those already embedded in the market. In this paper we focus on this relationship through the lens of asset-based welfare, which, we argue, is now undermining owner-occupation.
The paper begins by examining developments in home ownership and asset-based welfare in recent decades, focusing on the UK as an illustrative case. We go on to consider, drawing on various survey data, how housing assets, in both pre-and postcrisis contexts, have provided means to supplement pensions and enhance welfare and economic security. Mechanisms include the income-in-kind enjoyed by un-mortgaged homeowners, homes as fungible assets realized through downsizing or equity release markets, and property speculation and landlordism. Finally, we address the wider socioeconomic and political implications of housing market restructuring and the conflicting policy demands of homeowners and renters under emerging asset-based welfare conditions. While housing sectors have historically been absent in analyses of social and welfare state restructuring (Ronald, 2008) , attention has increasingly centered on housing markets and finance as features that shape political economies and may reorient capitalist welfare regimes (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008) . In this RONALD, LENNARTZ & KADI August 2015 5
paper, through the analysis of the changing approaches to, and practices of assetbased welfare, we aim to demonstrate the continued significance of home ownership in post-crisis neoliberal restructuring, emerging practices of residential capitalism and associated spatial and intergenerational patterns of social inequality.
Homes, Assets and Welfare
While family owned housing has long been an implicit part of welfare provision in many societies, particularly Southern Europe (Castles and Fererra, 1996) , a growing awareness of the welfare outcomes of private home ownership and how this sector complements other forms of provision within welfare systems overall has increasingly resonated across higher spending welfare states (Ansell, 2014; Doling and Ronald 2010; Groves et al 2007; Malpass 2008; Norris and Shiels, 2007) . Specifically, the ownership of a home can constitute a primary family node for the delivery of shelter as well as exchanges of informal care and asset wealth, potentially reducing household dependency on the state. At the same time, mortgage debt commodifies the household and embeds them deeper in architectures of local and globally connected finance. Housing markets, distributions of housing property wealth and mortgage debt thus have important outcomes for the development of welfare regimes overall (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008) .
Housing privatization became a common policy focus after 1980, with the erosion of social housing stimulating private demand, and prices, further. This not only enhanced the association of home ownership with capital gains but also economic security. In economically liberal, English speaking regimes like the UK and Ireland, the initial idea of 'property owning democracy' was later mooted as a means to build societies of asset owners and thus supplant Keynesian style state transfers that require high taxation with 'asset-based welfare' (Ronald, 2008) . Moreover, the expansion of home ownership and property prices in the 2000s ostensibly enhanced what refer to as 'welfare switching', with households increasingly looking to this wealth to privately provide for welfare goods or retirement needs, potentially compensating for diminishing collective provisions of pensions and services.
Political discourses, meanwhile, became ever more explicit about the potential of home ownership to supplement pensions and state benefits (see Watson, 2009 ). In context of fiscal strains and pressures for greater market deregulation, governments incorporated policies and practices that aligned with asset-based welfare (Malpass, 2008) . Rather than relying on social transfers to counter welfare insecurity, individuals themselves were increasingly expected to accept greater personal responsibility for accumulating assets, which would enable them to make their own welfare arrangements (see Conley and Gifford, 2006 ). An important role of the state then, as embraced by the UK Labour government, for example, was to help facilitate asset accumulation. Housing was not the only asset of asset-based-welfare, but was increasingly targeted, and typically constituted a household's largest or most effective asset accumulation vehicle. Individual households too demonstrated growing sensitivity to the value stored in their homes for ensuring economic security in later life (Smith et al, 2009 ).
For Crouch (2009) , the concept of 'privatised' or 'house-price' Keynesianism best captured emerging welfare relations and the role of owner-occupied housing therein.
The post-war Keynesian growth model had followed a demand management process with a welfare system sustained by redistributive tax transfer mechanisms. From the 1980s, however, more economically liberal governments sought to shift responsibilities by writing down public debt, reducing tax and extending market provision. The new dynamics of growth specifically required loose lending for home purchase, shifting debt from public to private household balance sheets, with anticipated increases in housing values supporting further growth. Both private and public sectors operated on the assumption that house price increases would erode household debt and sustain consumption more broadly, which in turn would support a low-tax, lower spending public welfare model. Rather than state regulated income transfers providing social insurance, the state thus supported home buying and effectively encouraged house price augmentation by facilitating the integration of commercial and investment banking in mortgage lending (see also Ansell, 2014) .
Individual households, meanwhile, were expected to save or spend their housing wealth accordingly, compensating for their own welfare and pension income needs.
Critically, housing markets in the pre-GFC era became intertwined with the logic and practice of welfare switching. With the demise of post-war Keynesianism, new forms of market rationality necessary for sustaining asset-based welfare emerged circulating around newly constituted 'homeowner investor subjects' (see Clark, 2012; Langley, 2006; Smith et al., 2009 ). For Watson (2009 , for regular homebuyers the calculations of everyday life came to mimic those of professional investors: 'how to treat life itself as a series of investment decisions; how to position the households' assets on the right side of pricing trends; and how to plan for the long term by being able to continually trade up the value of assets' (p.45). In the housing market this became extant with people buying and selling not only a means to get better housing, but also to 'increase the store of wealth afforded by owner-occupation' (Groves et al, 2007, p189) .
The house buying and lending bubble that emerged escalated on an unprecedented scale through most of the 2000s, with the aggregate value of UK housing property, for example, increasing from £2.9 trillion in 2002 to £5.4 trillion by 2007 (Savills, 2014) .
Although increases in lending were largely responsible for the housing bubble (Schiller, 2008) , a growing sense that wealth accumulates more rapidly among property owners, and, moreover, that home purchase is a good investment against insecurity and welfare shortfalls in later life were also key drivers. Nonetheless, the miscalculation of risk and overleveraging of the economy finally came to a head with the 2007 Subprime and Credit Crises that would later turn into the 2008 GFC.
Accessing Property Asset Wealth
Before the onset of these crises, British and EU governments had explicitly stated that the housing wealth of homeowners represented a welfare resource that individual households would be expected to draw on in future (Doling and Ford, 2007) . The projected growth in private housing wealth matched an obvious gap in future public and private provision. In the UK, it was expected that social care expenditure would need to increase more than threefold (325%) by 2041 to meet the pressures of an ageing society (DCLG, 2008) . It was also clear, nonetheless, that existing pension provisions were far from adequate with twelve million people (around one-in-three adults aged 35 to 64) not saving enough, or not saving at all, for retirement. This figure included 22% that owned their own home (Segars, 2012 The presumption was however, that housing equity represented a relatively liquid asset and could be accessed in more or less conventional ways (see Clark, 2012) . there is a particular distribution of housing costs over the life-course (see Kemeny, 1981) . Initially, the costs of the deposit and repayments are proportionately high relative to income. With inflation, wage increases and mortgage repayment, however, housing costs diminish over time. The ageing owner-occupier household thus, through their home, experiences diminishing dependence on public provision, offset by both their growing private property asset wealth and by the 'income in-kind' i generated by living relatively housing-cost free once the mortgage is repaid. Although conditions of retired owner-occupiers vary, most can, due to their housing situation, live on smaller pensions (Doling and Ronald, 2010 . The most typical model involves a financial firm offering a loan secured on the home with the occupier continuing to own and dwell in the home, usually paying off the loan and interest on death through the sale of the property. Such products can be taken as a monthly income or lump sum, and are normally based on only a portion of the total property value, meaning that some inheritance can remain.
The above mechanisms have inevitably evolved along with the crisis and subsequent socioeconomic restructuring, reshaping interactions between state, market and household in respect to housing commodities as means of achieving welfare security.
They have also taken on a new hue in context of the post-crisis era, where mortgage lending became scarcer, economic conditions less favorable and property value increases more volatile. Nonetheless, recent transformations in asset-based welfare practices seem to have been accelerated, rather than been initiated, by the GFC, with related housing market shifts emerging in the early-2000s, as we explore later.
Housing, Asset-based Welfare and Post-crisis Policy
In the initial post-GFC milieu, UK housing prices fell by an average of 16%, and much more in some regions, before balancing out at around 10% below 2007 peak prices, in 2010. Demand withered with the fading of credit, and, in combination with declining confidence, home buying activity dropped by almost half ii (ONS, 2013) .
The crisis helped reframe asset-based welfare demonstrating that just when households needed to access (housing) assets as a safety-net (against unemployment or a drop in household income), the very economic conditions that brought pressure to bear, typically undermine both values and liquidity (Ronald and Doling, 2012) .
In policy, after an initial round of stability measures, new welfare and pension reforms began to take shape featuring austerity on the one hand, and deeper protection of elderly people's incomes on the other iii . In order to protect the pension system, a faster timetable for state pension age increases was established in the 2011 and 2014
Pension Acts. A new pension auto-enrolment framework was also started in 2012 to support retirement savings among the millions of, typically low-income, people who were not adequately saving for old-age. In terms of housing policy, the Help-to-Buy programme was rolled out in 2013, which at first guaranteed new home buyer's deposits, but since 2015 also assists saving for a first home down-payment.
Meanwhile, in context of a sharp rise in renting and rents, housing benefit regulations have been tightened, especially for people aged 34 and under, and the social housing sector undermined further (see Tunstall, 2015) . 
Changing Households Approaches to Asset-based Welfare
While policy has become more ambiguous, property owning cohorts themselves appear to have focused on mobilizing their housing wealth in particular ways. The following draws on various public survey and market data to discern specific patterns.
We seek to unravel is how established homeowners -especially those who bought property before the last house-price boom -are dealing with a new asset-based welfare landscape in which housing continues to represent a private welfare pillar. We consider the modes of access to housing wealth addressed above, as well as private landlordism, which has gained particular momentum in the last decade, but has not been well integrated into analyses of emerging asset-based welfare conditions. We take-off from analyses of asset-based welfare established before the crisis (cf. Groves et al, 2007; Malpass, 2008; Watson, 2009) Housing wealth has also become extraordinarily uneven geographically, especially since the crisis. Although London housing values have been consistently higher than the rest of the UK (Hamnett, 1999) , between 2008 and 2013, prime central London property v increased 23.9% compared to average declines of between 9.5% and 16.2%
across the rest of the UK (Halifax, 2014) . Critically, house prices in London, and spilling over into the South East, have been effected by more global flows of capital, which have increasingly found urban housing a safe haven. This has added to distortions in the housing assets of households in South East England, especially those who entered the market early. Indeed, the ratio of mortgage debt among owneroccupiers averaged 12% in London in contrast to 27% across the UK (Savills, 2014) .
With increases in property values, not only has the distribution of wealth been distorted, so too have benefits. Dorling et al (2005) Although most owner-occupiers dedicate a large part of their incomes for a large proportion of their lives to serving a mortgage, their housing wealth remains locked-in and other than making housing costs cheaper in later life, does little to compensate for a low-income. Terry and Gibson (2010) identify that around one-million older people who own a home worth over £100,000 have incomes so low that they would qualify for means-tested social security benefits. This applies to elderly homeowners in particular and Rowlingson and Mckay (2005) estimate that 67% of pensioner couples and 53% of singles are above the median for the overall asset distribution and below the median for the overall income distribution.
Trading Down
The main problem for people wishing to tap housing assets to support welfare and living standards is that cashing in effectively undermines in-kind benefits. Similarly, a home also connects a household to a location and, often, years of aggregated social capital that can help support welfare in later life. Both factors may contribute to a low-level of home sales in order to capture housing equity amongst older owneroccupiers, and there has been little evidence of widespread trading down to serve welfare needs since the crisis. Indeed, people aged 65 or over account for less than 8% of home-movers each year (ONS, 2013) . It is often other factors that trigger downsizing related to lifestyle preferences -such as the desire to move closer to family and young grandchildren -or a life event, such as the death of a spouse, that triggers the change to a smaller home (see Pannell et al., 2013) .
Nonetheless, research also suggests that older cohorts of homeowners have become more accustomed to the idea of housing moves as a financial strategy that can maximize the effects of house price increases and asset accumulation. A recent report by UK cross party think tank, Demos (2013), found six in ten people over 60 were in favour of moving and one in four would prefer to buy a retirement property, reflecting a particular pragmatism regarding the home in later life. For older homeowners with a larger family property, the potential of wealth release through downsizing may be considerable. A move from a four to a two-bed home can release over £210,000 on average, while a move from a five to a three-bed home could potentially generate £450,000 (Savills, 2014) . According to the same source, around 55,000 homeowners currently downsize each year, releasing around £7 billion equity.
Of course, most retirees do not necessarily own large properties from which to downsize, and, moreover, differences in regional averages suggest that in many parts of the UK, trading down would produce significantly less capital. According to Savills, in only 11% of UK locations would downsizing from a typical three-bed to a two-bed property release more than £100,000 equity. On average, downsizing can release around £123,000 although the figure is less than £100,000 in almost half of UK locations. Similarly, only those with larger properties, or those moving to a cheaper region can really generate enough capital to make a significant difference to real income and welfare conditions. For instance, Haggart (2012) estimates that in order to generate a modest annual income of £10,000 (through the purchase of an annuity product, for example) would require a capital sum of £200,000. This could be potentially achieved by a move from a 4-to a 2-bedroom property in only 35% of locations in the UK. By contrast, the particular concentration of housing wealth in London and the South East seems to facilitate more intensive movement reflecting particular social, geographical and historic advantages.
The potential to trade down or tap into housing wealth for an older household's needs has also increasingly been trumped in recent years by the need to help out other, typically younger, family members, especially in terms of inter-generational assistance in accessing home ownership. Between 1995 and 2006, the numbers of first time buyers receiving help from parents had risen from 10% to 38% (CML 2006).
Since then, it has been estimated that parental help with deposits for first time buyers has escalated to more than half of all transactions (CML, 2010) . Research for the UK charity Shelter meanwhile, estimates that parents now spend around £2 billion a year helping their children buy their first home (Humphries and Scott, 2013) .
Two other family-related factors have also affected capacities to release housing property wealth (i.e. downsizing) or use this wealth for their own needs. First has been the significant rise in adult children either 'boomeranging' back, or not leaving the parental home at all (Lennartz et al., 2015) . According to ONS data 2.9 million people aged 20-40 were living with parents in 2012, representing a 20% rise since 1997. Second has been preferences for, and growing pressure to, pass on housing wealth, usually as inheritance. Rowlingson and McKay (2005) , however, establish that while households aged 70 or over are most likely to see an owner-occupied home as a legacy for their descendants, those in their fifties are more resistant to the idea and may eye this wealth as a means to maintain consumption in later life. This may arguably mirror shifting attitudes over the life-course, but may equally reflect shifting expectations of pensions, welfare and housing markets across cohorts. Either way, an ostensible conflict has emerged between the desire to live comfortably in later life, involving tapping housing equity for individual needs, and expectations of having to help offspring through longer co-residence and housing wealth transfers.
The Equity Release Market
Of the so called 'new' ways to access capital held in owner-occupied housing, either extending the current mortgage of buying a reverse mortgage product (equity release) have proved increasingly popular in the UK (see Fox O'mahony & Overton, 2015) .
Leading up to the crisis, almost one in three mortgaged homeowners were withdrawing equity annually according to Lowe et al., (2012) While the resurgence in equity release may indicate that housing wealth is becoming particularly liquid again, its role in supporting asset-based welfare strategies has been questioned. Overton's (2010) study of equity release customers found that capital released from the home was most likely to be used for house maintenance and repairs (46%), holidays (36%) and clearing other debts (35%). Equity release was thus more typically used for consumption and debt serving activities rather than supplement income in later life. Research has also found that many reverse mortgage consumers are, rather than elderly households toward the end of the life-cycle, middle-aged people tapping into their home early to serve family rather than individual needs, and in particular the costs of raising children (Lowe et al, 2012) .
In short, despite its recent resurgence, equity release remains a limited market and represents only 0.6%, by value, of all mortgage sales. It has also been estimated that only 2% of households have engaged in equity release schemes (ERC, 2014). There remains a lack of familiarity with such schemes and many households, especially older ones, remain wary (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2009 ). Thus, while more households have become active around equity release, it seems to best serve a particular sector who are essentially 'eating' their asset out of necessity rather than strategically accessing it in order to support income or welfare needs in later life (Fox O'mahony & Overton, 2015) .
Private Landlordism and Asset-based Welfare
Along with the rise in home ownership, private renting declined from almost nine-inten homes in 1918 to around one-in-ten by the end of the twentieth century (see Crook and Kemp, 2014) . However, over the last decade or so the private rental sector ( Government data provides considerable insight into how new landlordism has been shaped by the 'investor subjects' of asset-based welfare. Although private sector letting is often assumed to have professionalised in the UK, as Figure Four illustrates, the sharp rise in rented dwellings has been closely matched by an increase in numbers of landlords. Indeed, the ratio of landlords comprised of private individuals increased from 61% in 1998 to 89% by 2010, while the proportion derived from private and public companies and other types of organisations fell from 22% and 18% to 5% and 6%, respectively. The evidence also attests to the recent arrival of most landlords with 51% of all PRS dwellings being acquired after 2000, which helps account for the significant increase in sector size between 2002 and 2012 (see Figure 4) . Most landlords are highly inexperienced, and while 69% have had properties for 10 years or less, 22% have three years' or less experience (DCLG, 2010) . The amateur status of PRS ownership and management is also illustrated by the fact that as many as 78% of all landlords rent out just a single dwelling. Rents have also increased ahead of inflation, and more than double this rate in According to a survey of saving by pension company, Scottish Widows (2014) , younger renters now face a 15-year wait to buy a property. While the average firsttime buyer deposit is nearly £31,000, the typical private renter is only able to save around £2,100 a year. Furthermore, the survey found that 33% of private renters were not putting any money away while 29% had no savings at all.
In understanding the new landscape of asset-based welfare, the opportunities provided by shifts in both buying and rental market conditions appear particularly salient.
Among the means available to capitalise on housing wealth in order to plan for a reduced income in later life, translating savings and even leveraging owner-occupied housing equity into an extra property has become particularly attractive. Critical has been the escalating financialization since the 1980s (see Aalbers, 2015) , making lending more sophisticated in terms of response to demand and product diversity, and housing policy deregulation (Kemp, 2015) , making entering and managing rental property less risky and more profitable. While not all homeowners who have accumulated housing wealth with a view to welfare self-reliance look to landlordism as a way to maximize that security, evidence suggests that significant numbers have.
There are now more than 2.1 million landlords (compared to 560,000 in 1991) serving 
Discussion
So then, what did happen to asset-based welfare? Fundamentally, it has adapted and endured, shaping developments in housing markets and polices, as well as individual asset wealth and welfare strategies. While the GFC appeared to undermine the home ownership base of asset-based welfare, the crisis actually helped refine the role of housing property in social, economic and welfare relations. Imputed income among un-mortgaged homeowners has been strengthened, with baby-boom cohorts particularly advantaged by housing market cycles that have also provided them large and relatively fungible assets. The generation that followed them has also been advantaged, but also mobilized around housing property as a means of achieving nonhousing goals. The most significant equity borrowers have been middle aged rather than retired homeowners (Lowe et al, 2012) , and while most private landlords are aged 45 to 64, the most significant increase has been among those aged 35 to 44 (Lord et al, 2013) . Of course, there are significant inequalities within cohorts, not only defined by tenure, but also by relative housing market position and geographic location. Moreover, along with austerity policy, housing has become an even more important focus of welfare switching, intensifying activities with families and across generations in terms of co-residency, care exchanges and wealth transfers. Research on equity release and intergenerational transfers (Overton, 2010) , suggest that financially advantaged cohorts are in fact likely to transfer housing wealth to less well-off offspring long before they inherit.
There are a number of social and policy issues to consider in regard to transformations in housing and asset-based welfare. Firstly, policy makers had assumed that the promotion of home ownership would reduce pressure on public welfare budgets as households became equity richer and more welfare self-reliant.
Nonetheless, the price increases that drove housing wealth accumulation among A core objective of this paper has been to link asset-based-welfare debates with emerging socioeconomic conditions and housing market realignments. A specific concern has been shifting approaches to housing goods as potential sources of income, investment and welfare provision. Home ownership has certainly been transformed, with shifts also reflecting realignment in welfare capitalism and ongoing processes of neo-liberalization. In terms of the latter, Forrest and Hirayama (2015) have recently pointed to the erosion of home ownership as a 'social project' -that integrates households into, and cushions the effects of, economic liberalization -in favour of a more financialized 'neo-liberal project' focused on profit making. The analysis in this paper supports this in part, especially in the identification of a new breed of private landlord and intensified rent seeking in the circulation of housing goods. Nonetheless, legacies of the previous era remain, and despite 'greater concentrations of residential property assets with the property poor paying market rents to the property rich' (ibid, p.239), governments still seek to reignite, as evidence by the 2015 relaunch of 'Right-to-Buy', the spirit of the property owning democracy.
Moreover, the property rich themselves, although geared around investment, generally seek to share the benefits with kin and to promote home ownership based asset accumulation through intergenerational family transfers of housing wealth.
Conclusions
The above analysis seeks to contribute to social science and policy debates surrounding housing and welfare in a number of ways. Firstly, as Montgomerie and Büdenbender (2015) , point out, we know that housing is a significant part of the finance-led welfare regime, 'but little by way… of how housing finance and welfare are enacted in everyday life' (p14). Our analysis of how the wealth represented by the home is being renegotiated sheds light on the links between shifting housing, pension, and welfare conditions, the revival of private landlordism and the intensification of 'generation rent'. Thus, whereas Schwartz (2012) , emphasizes links between pension funds and mortgage sectors at the macro level, we have examined more refined links between retirement savings and housing markets, as well outcomes in terms of downsizing and equity borrowing etc., as well as land-lording and hoarding activities.
What are arguably still needed are more precise analyses of processes at work at the individual level.
Secondly, what has also become evident is that certain groups of homeownersparticularly older cohorts living in specific urban areas (especially London) -have benefited from housing in ways that can be considered asset-based welfare, but cannot be repeated as housing markets represent unique sets of socio-economic and political circumstances. While asset-based welfare has functioned as a welfare or pension strategy for some groups, conditions for future housing wealth accumulation have been exhausted, creating what Ronald (2008) , describes as a 'post-home ownership regime' (p.250) featuring declining owner-occupancy rates and greater distortions in the distribution of tenure, assets and equity. Governments, nonetheless, seem bound to outdated conceptions of home ownership and housing welfare, and continue to look to house price increases as means for households to improve their welfare prospects, rather than a force that enhances inequalities.
Thirdly, the British case, as examined here, arguably provides insights into housing and welfare developments elsewhere. Across Anglophone countries, similar patterns of asset-based welfare reforms along with declines in home ownership rates that reflect similar polarizations in housing access and equity conditions are also extant (e.g. Ong et al., 2013) . They have also been evident in countries like Japan and South
Korea (Forrest and Hirayama, 2009) , that have similarly relied on housing assets to substitute for public welfare. At the same time, there are broad distinctions that reflect different urban concentrations of housing wealth, advances in equity borrowing industries and regulations regarding the treatment of tenants and income from property, among other factors. Looking across Europe, while there is some evidence of intergenerational realignment in housing access and equity (Lennartz et al, 2015) , there are fewer signs of 'generation rent' or 'generation landlord', suggesting a significant impact of asset-based welfare restructuring in the economically liberal Anglophone countries and particular path dependencies. In 2007, Groves et al., hinted at the shape of a new welfare state, molded around changing distributions in, and augmentation of, housing assets. What seems likely from our analysis is that welfare states and conditions are continuing to be shaped by housing-finance led welfare regimes, but in ways that are worryingly counter progressive in terms of housing distribution and socio-economic inequality.
i In attempting to put a simple value on this income, Savills Property Research (2014) estimate, assuming an un-mortgaged retirement period of 20 years and an average rents of £9,000 a year, that the average UK home represents an inputted income of £180,000 ii Transactions fell from 1.6 mil to just over 800,000 pa.
iii For example, the existing means tested Pension Credit was enhanced in 2011 in order to protect incomes as well as access to housing benefits for retired people. iv 67% owner-occupation among 25 to 34 year-olds in 1991 compared to 43% in 2011. For 16 to 25 year olds the drop was from 36% to 10% between 1991 and 2011(English Housing Survey). v In the boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea, property sales achieving over £1 million accounted for 69% of sales in 2013 (Savills, 2014) vi Of such housing, 37% of the total value of PRS, and 19% of UK stock is located in London (Savills, 2014 xi The 2015 budget also announced a reduction in mortgage interest tax deductibility (from 45% to 20%) for BtL landlords, from 2017. While this may reduce profitability, it will have no effect on un--mortgaged landlords and cash buyers (who now account for more than one--in--three purchases (Halifax, 2015) .
